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Abstract 
 
An open market share buyback is not a firm commitment, and there is limited evidence on 
whether firms repurchase the intended shares. Unlike US studies, we use data from unique 
UK regulatory and disclosure environment that allows to accurately measure the share 
buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure and CEO overconfidence 
are significant determinants of the share buyback completion rate. In addition, we find that 
large and widely held firms that conduct subsequent buyback programs and have a past 
buyback completion reputation exhibit higher completion rates. Finally, we assess whether 
other CEO characteristics affect buyback completion rates and find that firms with senior 
CEOs who hold external directorships and have a longer tenure as CEO are more likely to 
complete the buyback programs. In sum, our results suggest there is a clear relationship 
between information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and buyback completion rates. 
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1. Introduction 
When firms announce they intend to repurchase shares, the market reacts positively 
(Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Chan et al., 2004), even though such 
announcements are not firm commitments and, therefore, costless. Moreover, firms can 
consciously use share repurchase announcements to boost their share price while 
misleading shareholders, since there is no long-term economic benefit (Chan et al., 2010). 
HoweverVKDUHEX\EDFNDQQRXQFHPHQWVDWWUDFWWKHPDUNHW¶VVFUXWLQ\, preventing bad 
firms from mimicking good firms. Thus, buyback announcements can be credible, which 
justifies the positive market reaction (Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 2003).  
Typically, firms are not required to disclose their intention to conduct an open 
market share buyback, though many firms do. Interestingly, when firms announce they 
intend to repurchase shares, some choose to disclose explicit information on the intended 
buyback while others do not. When firms make no share buyback announcements, 
managers reserve the flexibility to repurchase shares before any mispricing discovery by 
the market. When firms announce only their intention to repurchase shares without explicit 
details, managers send a mispricing signal to the market that reduces the PDQDJHUV¶
flexibility in taking advantage of any early mispricing. When firms disclose the full details 
of their intended buyback program, the firms signal to the market that they have a clear 
strategy and intention to repurchase shares (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Therefore, 
understanding why firms announce explicit information and whether information 
disclosure is related to buyback completion rates is important. We contribute to the 
literature by testing whether disclosing explicit information (or not) about the intended 
EX\EDFNSURJUDPFDQVHUYHDVDVWURQJLQGLFDWRURIILUPV¶UHDOLQWHQWLRQVto deliver on the 
promise to repurchase shares. We find strong evidence supporting our expectations that 
announcing explicit information about the shares intended to be repurchased can serve as a 
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VWURQJVLJQDORIILUPV¶³FRPPLWPHQW´WRIROORZWKURXJKZLWKWKHLUDQQRXQFHGEX\EDFN
programs.   
When firms intend to repurchase shares, managers, and effectively chief executive 
officers (CEOs), reserve flexibility on the timing of and method for implementing the 
buyback program (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000). Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) find that managerial overconfidence influences corporate investment 
decisions. In addition, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs make 
more acquisitions and the market reacts negatively to such acquisitions. Malmendier et al. 
(2011) show that overconfident managers view their firms as undervalued and external 
financing as expensive, and thus issue less equity compared to their peers. In addition, they 
show that overconfidence and early life experience explain ILUPV¶capital structure 
variations. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher 
return volatility, invest more in innovations, obtain more patents and patent citations, and 
achieve greater success in innovative research and developments. In this paper, we 
examine whether overconfident CEOs perceive their equities as undervalued and complete 
the announced buyback programs. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate 
the impact of CEO overconfidence and other CEO traits on share buyback programs and 
their implementation. We find that overconfident CEOs perceive their shares as 
undervalued and have a higher buyback completion rate. 
Another stream in the literature shows that CEO traits can have a significant impact 
on corporate decisions, such as the decisions affecting capital structure (Cronqvist et al., 
2012), financing choices (Malmendier et al., 2011), and risk-taking attitude (Masulis and 
Mobbs, 2011). Frank and Goyal (2007) find that CEO characteristics can have a significant 
impact on the variation in leverage across firms. Yim (2013) shows that CEO age is 
positively related to mergers and acquisitions. Song and Thakor (2006) deal with the 
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incentives for a CEO to provide less precise signals about projects proposed to the board, 
and Hermalin and Katz (2000) develop a model in which CEOs have an incentive to 
choose a less informative regime that would be desired by the owners.  
CEOs with a long tenure in a firm are more likely to be entrenched, thus exerting 
more influence with low levels of ownership simply by virtue of tenure (Morck et al., 
1988) and avoiding any agency monitoring (Hill and Phan, 1991). Moreover, powerful and 
entrenched CEOs can influence the board composition toward their preference, leading to 
a weakening of board monitoring (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Consequently, tenured 
CEOs are OHVVOLNHO\WRVXFFXPEWRVKDUHKROGHUV¶SUHVVXUHto make a payout in the form of 
share buybacks to reduce potential agency costs. Overall, we have limited knowledge on 
the potential impact that varying CEO characteristics have on corporate financing 
decisions and in effect on payout policies. We relate CEO traits and disclosure policies 
with share buyback completion rates and find that firms with more senior CEOs who have 
more corporate connections and longer tenure as a CEO are significantly more likely to 
complete WKHILUPV¶ share buyback programs. 
Though the information disclosure precedes buyback announcements, its relation 
with buyback completion rates may be affected by the omitted factors driving disclosures 
and buyback completion rates. It is important that we separate out the real effects of 
information disclosures from the effects of company characteristics and CEO 
characteristics that provide disclosure. Thus, we consider information disclosure as 
endogenous with the buyback completion rate. We conduct a Hausman (1978) test of 
endogeneity and model information disclosure and buyback completion rate in a two-stage 
regression framework as in Brockman et al. (2008). Although we find that information 
disclosure is endogenous, a positive relationship between information disclosure and the 
buyback completion rate survives after controlling for endogeneity.  
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Until the mid-2000s, the only disclosure requirement regarding open market buyback 
programs in the United States (US) was the quarterly reporting of the number of shares 
outstanding. Therefore, tracing stock repurchases connected to a specific buyback 
announcement was challenging and became questionable whether firms are committed to 
completing the intended buyback programs. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that the 
buyback completion rates can significantly deviate from the intended target initially set by 
the firms.1 Bonaimé (2012) uses several buyback proxies and finds that the average 
completion rate in a sample of US listed firms is approximately 73%. According to Kim et 
al. 86GLVFORVXUHUHTXLUHPHQWV³DUHDPRQJWKHOHDVWVWULQJHQW´RIDOOthe major 
stock exchanges the researchers examined. Following a change in US regulations in 2004, 
firms are held to a higher degree of disclosure regarding share buyback program, but even 
so, these requirements do not allow for accurate and timely measurement of buyback 
completion rates.2 Banyi et al. (2008) assess the accuracy of the share buyback proxies 
commonly used in the US literature and find strong evidence suggesting these proxies 
suffer from inaccuracies, potentially leading to a significant distortion of the evidence and 
interpretations reported in the existing literature. This has been only partially addressed 
following the change in US regulations in 2004; firms are now required to disclose 
buyback trades but on quarterly statements.  
                                                 
1
 Fama and French (2001) adjust the changes in Treasury stock used by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) to 
DFFRXQWIRUWKHFDQFHOODWLRQRI7UHDVXU\VKDUHVKRZHYHUWKHUHVHDUFKHUV¶IRFXVLVQRWPHDVXULQJWKH
EX\EDFNSURJUDPV¶FRPSOHWLRQUDWHV 
2
 In particular, according to the change in Rule 10b-18 of the SEC Act of 1934 in the US, concerning the 
disclosure requirements of open market buybacks, listed firms are required to report on a monthly basis the 
exact volume and price data of their repurchasing activity in their prerequisite quarterly filings. This change 
in Rule 10b-18 was introduced on December 17, 2003; however, it became effective for all quarterly and 
annual filings for periods ending on or after March 15, 2004. 
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We overcome the unavoidable measurement and reporting timing inaccuracies of the 
US studies by using accurate daily share buyback data from the more rigorous disclosure 
environment of the UK.3 UK regulations mandate that firms disclose the repurchased 
shares and the price paid on the day when the actual repurchase trades occur, until the start 
of the following trading day. Since the UK has similar institutional and regulatory 
frameworks to the US but a more stringent disclosure regime, even compared to other 
European countries where share repurchase trades are reported monthly, it constitutes a 
unique setting for analyzing the drivers of share buyback completion rates.  
In sum, we find that greater information disclosure and CEO overconfidence have a 
significant influence on firms completing their intended buyback programs. We also find 
that CEO age, connectedness, and tenure affect share buyback completion, while 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics. Moreover, we find that firms that initiate their 
buyback program shortly after the announcement and conduct repeat buyback programs 
are more likely to have higher buyback completion rates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the literature is reviewed 
and the hypotheses set. In section 3, the data, variable definitions, estimation methods, and 
descriptive statistics are discussed. In section 4, the results for the factors that influence 
share buyback completion rates are discussed. The robustness tests are presented in section 
5. The conclusions are in section 6. 
                                                 
3
 Oswald and Young (2004) in the UK, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) in France, and Zhang (2005) in Hong 
Kong use daily data on share repurchases and the respective actual repurchase trades; however, the 
researchers do not focus on the completion rates of the announced share repurchase programs or on 
identifying the factors that affect WKHSURJUDPV¶ completion. 
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2. Review of literature and hypotheses 
2.1. Disclosing details on buybacks and buyback completion rate 
Corporate disclosures could alleviate the adverse selection problems (Verrecchia, 
2001) and increase the liquidity of shares or reduce the agency cost (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2012) by mitigating the information asymmetries. Previous studies show that an 
increase in voluntary disclosure reduces firms¶ cost of capital. Several papers study the 
relationship between disclosure ratings from the Association for Investment Research 
(AIMR) and the cost of capital measures such as bid-ask spread and trading volume (e.g., 
Healey et al., 1999). Some studies use self-constructed measures of disclosures and link 
these measures with measures of the cost of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997). Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) examine the link between the choice of accounting regime and the cost 
of capital and find that when firms increase voluntary disclosures their cost of capital 
decreases. Leone et al. (2007) examine the dollar detailed use of IPO proceeds (as 
disclosed by the issuer) and its relationship with underpricing. They show that IPO 
underpricing is lower when companies disclose more specific information.4  
Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) develop a formal model of information disclosure 
and corporate governance. They show that larger firms adopt stricter disclosure rules than 
smaller firms. Their model suggests that greater or more informative disclosure could lead 
in changes in real investments, favoring short-term investments as opposed to long-term 
investments. Their model also suggests that in greater or more informative disclosure 
industries management pay and turnover are higher than in industries with less informative 
disclosure.   
After the share buyback is authorized, managers can follow three main routes for 
repurchasing shares in the open market. First, the managers can make no announcement of 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed review of the recent literature on corporate voluntary disclosures, see Beyer et al. (2010). 
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their intention to repurchase shares. Thus, the managers reserve the option RIDQ³HDUO\-
DGRSWLRQ´VWUDWHJ\DQGuse their inside information to repurchase shares before the 
undervaluation is discovered by the market (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Second, 
managers can announce their intention to repurchase shares but without disclosing specific 
details of the intended program. This way, managers reserve the option to repurchase 
shares when shares are mispriced but lose the advantage of exploiting a significant 
mispricing, since the managers already alerted the market to a potential undervaluation. 
Therefore, this ³ZDLW-to-DGRSW´VWUDWHJ\ has a smaller advantage against the market in 
exploiting significant undervaluations and is inferior to WKH³early-adoption´ strategy 
(Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Third, when the full details of the intended buyback 
program are disclosed, the announcement bears some cost, since the inherent flexibility of 
repurchasing undervalued shares is reduced, and by doing so, managers are trying to re-
SRVLWLRQWKHPDUNHW¶VYDOXDWLRQZLWKLQWKHLUSHUFHLYHG³IDLU´YDOXHOHYHOV However, 
enhancing the information disclosure increases the credibility of WKHPDQDJHUV¶ intention to 
UHSXUFKDVHVKDUHVZKHQIXWXUHVKDUHSULFHVDUHEHORZWKHLU³IDLU´SULFHOHYHOV(YHQWKRXJK
part of the flexibility to repurchase shares before the market realizes WKHILUP¶V
undervaluation is lost, managers can still exploit future mispricing opportunities arising 
from share price deviations from their fair value. This allows managers to accrue the 
superior informational advantage back to the firm, and in the absence of potential 
profitable investments, managers prefer to repurchase shares to maximize the wealth of 
long-term investors (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996) and reduce agency costs.  
We argue that firms disclosing specific information about their buyback program 
have a stronger commitment and a clear strategy for implementing and completing the 
announced buyback program. We test for this level of commitment with the dummy 
variable Buyback Information, which takes the value of one when an announcement of the 
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ILUP¶VLQWHQWLRQWREX\EDFNVKDUHVFRQWDLQVH[SOLFLWLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHLQWHnded 
buyback program and zero when no information is disclosed.5 Hence, this hypothesis is 
formally stated as follows:  
H1. Companies that disclose information on buyback programs have higher completion 
rates. 
2.2. CEO characteristics 
2.2.1. CEO overconfidence  
 
Managerial overconfidence and miscalibration can have significant explanatory 
power for a number of corporate decisions.6 For instance, Malmendier et al. (2011) show 
that overconfident managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external 
(equity) financing as overpriced. Therefore, managers use less external finance (equity) 
compared to their peers. Ben-David et al. (2012) show that managerial miscalibration is an 
important determinant of several corporate finance activities. The authors report that 
miscalibrated managers invest more, use more debt, are less likely to pay dividends, are 
more likely to repurchase shares, and use more long-term debt compared to short-term 
debt. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) assert that overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the net 
discounted expected payoffs from uncertain ventures, either because of a general tendency 
to expect good outcomes or because the CEOs overestimate their chances of success. The 
authors find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher return volatility, invest more 
in innovations, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve higher success in 
innovative research and developments. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that 
                                                 
5
 We consider as buyback announcements with explicit information those announcements stating the number 
of shares to be repurchased, or the amount in GB pounds to be used for open market buybacks, or a 
SHUFHQWDJHRIWKHILUP¶VFDSLWDOWREHUHSXUFKDVHG 
6
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a potential link between CEO overconfidence and buyback 
completion rates. 
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overconfident CEOs make more acquisitions and the market reactions for such CEOs are 
more negative. Ferris et al. (2013, forthcoming) extend CEO overconfidence in the context 
of international M&As. Malmendier and Tate (2005) propose that overconfident managers 
are optimistic about investment opportunities. However, these managers overestimate the 
YDOXHRIWKHLUILUPV¶HTXLW\7KHUHIRUHPDQDJHULDORYHUFRQILGHQFHLVUHODWHGWRPDQDJHUV
perceiving their stock as undervalued.  
CEOs who do not exercise their in-the-money stock options are considered 
overconfident (Malmendier et al., 2011) and believe that WKHLUILUP¶VVKDUHSULFHLV
undervalued. Consequently, they are more likely to buy back shares to exploit this 
perceived undervaluation. Hence, we hypothesize that managerial overconfidence is a 
determinant of the buyback completion rate. Similar to Malmendier et al. (2011), we 
measure CEO overconfidence as a late option exercise by CEOs, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for those CEOs who at any point during the sample 
period hold an option until the year of expiration even though the option is at least 40% in 
the money entering its final year. We formally state the testable hypothesis as follows: 
H2. CEO overconfidence is positively related to buyback completion rates.  
2.2.2. Other CEO characteristics  
The existing literature reports that CEO and managerial personnel characteristics 
have a significant impact on corporate policies. For example, Cronqvist et al. (2012) show 
WKDW&(2V¶SHUVRQDOEHKDYLRUDQGSHUVRQDOOHYHUDJHGHFLVLRQVFDQKDYHDVLJQLILFDQW 
impact on the capital structure decisions of the firms the CEOs manage. Malmendier et al. 
VKRZWKDWPDQDJHULDOWUDLWVFDQH[SODLQWKHILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJFKRLFHV0DVXOLVDQG
Mobbs (2011) show that firms with inside directors who hold outside directorships have 
better operating performance and market-to-book ratios, especially when monitoring is 
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more difficult. The evidence reported in the literature on the impact of CEO traits on value 
creation is mixed. 
Many studies show that network ties appear to enhance value by creating a free flow 
of information (Hochberg et al., 2007, for venture capital investment; Fracassi, 2008, for 
corporate investment). However, Guner et al. (2008) show that network ties tend to destroy 
value. In addition, Hwang and Kim (2009) argue that network connections through 
external directorships lead to higher executive compensation. Moreover, the authors argue 
that when boards are conventionally and socially independent CEO compensation 
decreases. This suggests that CEOs who are connected can strengthen their control over 
the board, leading to stronger CEO entrenchment. Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that 
powerful CEOs strengthen their position in the firm by hiring directors with whom the 
CEOs have social ties, leading to weakened monitoring. In extension, we argue that if a 
CEO is more connected, via external directorships, then weak motivation will persist to 
complete the buyback program. However, if more connected CEOs are overconfident, we 
expect a positive relationship between the buyback completion rate and CEO connectivity. 
We control for CEO connectivity with the variable Number of Directorships Held, which 
is the number of companies in which the CEO is serving as director at the time.  
Tenure can potentially provide CEOs with more time to align their interests with 
WKRVHRIWKHERDUG¶V0RUHRYHUWHQXUHG&(2Vcan strengthen their influence over the 
ERDUGOHDGLQJWRDQLQFUHDVHLQWKH&(2¶VSRZHU+LOODQG3KDQILQGWKDWWHQXUH
provides CEOs with time to avoid monitoring and any incentive alignment mechanisms. 
For instance, Morck et al. (1988) argue that managers can be deep-rooted with relatively 
low levels of ownership simply by virtue of WKHPDQDJHUV¶ tenure with the firm, status as 
founder, or personality. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) develop a model of the balance of 
power between the CEO and other directors that predicts that board independence declines 
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RYHUWKHFRXUVHRID&(2¶VWHQXUH:HDUJXHWKDW&(2VZLWKlonger tenure become more 
entrenched, and therefore have greater influence over the board and effectively the 
shareholders. Consequently, tenured CEOs are less likely to succumb to shareholder 
pressure to make a payout, in the form of share buyback programs, to reduce potential 
agency costs. Thus, we expect to find a negative relationship between CEO tenure and 
share buyback completion rates. In contrast, if CEO confidence increases with tenure (as in 
Yim, 2013), we would expect a positive relationship. We include the variable CEO 
Tenure, which is the difference between the start date as CEO and the date of the buyback 
announcement, expressed in years. 
CEO age can have a significant impact on decision making, since younger persons 
may be more prone to risk taking. However, experience grows with age, allowing 
executives to take more risks, but sensibly. Evidence suggests that risk aversion and age 
are nonlinear, as personal risk aversion tends to increase with age until the age of 70 and 
then decline (Shefrin, 2005). Moreover, Agarwal et al. (2007) report evidence suggesting 
that the sophistication of financial decisions varies with age. Yim (2013) show that CEO 
age is positively related to acquisition behavior. Therefore, we include in our analysis the 
variable Age to test whether executives who are more senior are more likely to stick to 
their commitments and complete the buyback program. CEO Age is the difference between 
WKH&(2¶VGDWHRIELUWKDQGWKH\HDURIWKHEX\EDFNDQQRXQFHPHQWH[SUHVVHGLQ\HDUV,Q
addition, we proxy for CEO experience with the Number of Companies Worked For, 
which is the number of companies at which the CEO has worked as a director until the 
time of the buyback announcement. We argue that CEOs want to maintain their reputation, 
the fact that the firm, and effectively the CEO, is credible and delivers on its promise of 
making a payout in the form of buyback programs.  
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Furthermore, we examine whether CEO education has an impact on share buybacks. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that fund managers with master of business 
administration degrees (MBAs) tend to take on more systematic risk. Therefore, we assess 
WKHLPSDFWRIWKH&(2¶VHGXFDWLRQZLWKWKHYDULDEOHBusiness Education, which is a 
dummy equal to one if the CEO received an education in business-related studies and zero 
otherwise. In addition, we include the variable Highest Education, which is a dummy 
HTXDOWRRQHLID&(2KDVDPDVWHU¶VGHJUHHRUDERYH:HIXUWKHUH[DPLQHZKHWKHU
pursuing a business-oriented career has an impact on buyback completion. Business or 
Non-business Career is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO pursued a business-
oriented career.  
Barber and Odean (2001) suggest that men tend to be more overconfident compared 
to women. Therefore, we control for CEO Gender, which is a dummy variable with the 
value of one if the CEO is male and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include the dummy 
variable FounderZKLFKWDNHVWKHYDOXHRIRQHLIWKH&(2LVWKHILUP¶VIRXQGHUDQG]HUR
otherwise. We also include the dummy variable Internally, which takes the value of one if 
the CEO was appointed internally and zero otherwise. Finally, since we investigate UK 
FRUSRUDWLRQVZHFRQWUROIRUWKH&(2¶VNationality, which is a dummy variable with a 
value of one if the CEO is a British national and zero otherwise. 
Hackbarth (2008) developed a model in which managers with growth perceptions 
bias repurchase shares when the managers perceive their equity as undervalued. Ben-
David et al. (2012) use demographic profiles of managers to examine whether certain 
characteristics are associated with overconfidence. In particular, the researchers use age, 
professional experience, education, and gender to test whether they are related to 
overconfidence. They relate overconfidence to several corporate decisions such as 
investment and financing decisions. Regarding share repurchases, the researchers propose 
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that overconfident managers engage in more share repurchases. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H3. CEO characteristics are related to CEO confidence and have a significant impact on 
buyback completion rates.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Share buyback data 
The sample is constructed by identifying all the announcements of ILUPV¶intentions 
to repurchase ordinary shares in the open market from hand-collected data, reported in 
news articles posted in the Perfect Analysis and Factiva databases from 1 January 1997 
through 31 December 2006. These databases report all news announcements available in 
the press made by UK corporations about open market share repurchases. The sample is 
refined to involve solely firms that announce their intention to repurchase ordinary shares 
in the open market, thus excluding announcements concerning the repurchase of B shares 
or preference shares. Additionally, we control the sample for American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) and cross-country listings. Furthermore, the firms included in the sample 
are required to list their share prices on DataStream and their accounting data on 
Worldscope. Finally, we exclude financial institutions from our sample. Thus, the final 
sample contains 400 announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market 
from corporations primarily listed in the United Kingdom. 
We collect our sample of open market share buyback trades from Zephyr, a database 
maintained by Bureau Van Dijk, for the corresponding publicly disclosed announcements 
of intention to repurchase shares. Following, we take random samples of buyback trades 
taken from Zephyr, and we cross-check their accuracy, i.e., date of execution and value of 
the trades against news strips taken from Factiva. Thus, we ensure the accuracy of 
measuring the number of the repurchased shares, and more importantly, in a timely 
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manner, since they are reported on a daily basis.7 We identify 13,378 open market buyback 
trades.  
For estimating the completion rate of the announced share repurchase programs, the 
total number of the reportedly repurchased shares is divided by the intended number of 
shares targeted at the time of the open market share repurchase announcement, which has 
been explicitly stated as the total number of shares. Alternatively, the rate is extrapolated 
E\WKHILUPV¶PDUNHWYDOXHZLWKWKHFXUUHQWSULFHDWWKHWLPHRIDQQRXQFHPHQWZKHQthe 
target percentage of shares to be repurchased is stated) or extrapolated from the relative 
value of the shares at the time of the announcement (when an explicit monetary value is 
disclosed in the announcement).  
3.2. CEO-specific characteristics 
:HORRNIRUFKLHIH[HFXWLYHRIILFHUV¶GHWDLOVLQ7KRPVRQ2QH%DQNHUDGDWDEDVH
PDLQWDLQHGE\7KRPVRQ5HXWHUVZKLFKSURYLGHVHDFKGLUHFWRU¶VQDPHDQGSRVLWLRQ (past 
DQGFXUUHQW,QDGGLWLRQWKLVGDWDEDVHSURYLGHVWKHGLUHFWRUV¶start and resignation dates. 
We calculate Tenure as CEO and Tenure in the firm from the start date to the departure 
date as CEO and as director, respectively. The database also provides the number of 
companies for which the director is a board member, and we collect that information as a 
proxy for CEO connectedness. A biography of the CEO is also provided in the database, 
from which we manually collect the CEO nationality and educational background. We 
complement any missing biographical information by searching past annual reports and 
other Internet sources and social networks such as LinkedIn. Finally, we collect all 
relevant data on CEO options from BoardEx and, in particular, RSWLRQV¶YHVWLQJGDWH
                                                 
7
 We randomly select 10% of our sample firms and collect the total number of repurchased shares from their 
fiscal year statements to validate the completion rates estimated from the collection of the daily actual share 
repurchase trades, and they show no significant qualitative and/or statistical differences.  
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number of exercisable options, exercise price, and options exercised for RXUVDPSOHILUPV¶
CEOs. 
3.3. Firm-specific characteristics 
7RHVWLPDWHWKHILUPV¶FRPPLWPHQWWRLPSOHPHQWLQJDQGFRPSOHWLQJWKHDQQRXQFHG
buyback programs, we use the variable Completion Rate, which is the percentage of the 
actually repurchased shares relative to the number targeted at the time of the 
announcement. As in Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Ikenberry et al. (2000), we control 
IRUDILUP¶VLQIRUPDWLRQDV\PPHWU\DQGHIILFLHQWSULFLQJZLWKWKHYDULDEOHSize, defined as 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization.  
Bonaimé (2012ILQGVWKDWDILUP¶VUHSXWDWion for completing past buyback programs 
has a significant impact on the market reaction (Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995; 
Chan et al., 2007), which is not as high for firms with a poor history of completing past 
buyback programs. Thus, we control IRUDILUP¶VSDVWUHSXWDWLRQIRUUHSXUFKDVLQJVKDUHVE\
including the variable Buyback Reputation, which is the completion rate of the most recent 
buyback program implemented by firm i.  
We argue that the fact that firms conduct more than one buyback program can serve 
as an indication of following through with their current buyback programs. Ikenberry et al. 
(2000) argue that managers could behave opportunistically and repurchase shares only 
when their respective prices are falling. Therefore, firms with consecutive buyback 
programs are more likely to behave opportunistically, since their primary goal is to 
distribute excess cash, leading to lower completion rates. Therefore, we include the 
dummy variable Buyback Repetition, which takes the value of one if a firm has announced 
its intention to buy back its shares in the past three years, and zero otherwise. In addition, 
we argue that if firms are not trading strategically and their primary goal for undertaking a 
share repurchase is to give their excess cash back to their shareholders, we expect to see 
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firms beginning the open share repurchase program as early as possible, without any 
delays. Therefore, if a firm initiates its repurchase program as early as possible, this could 
EHWDNHQDVWKHILUP¶VFRPPLtment to its repurchase program. For that reason, we include 
Initiation Lag, which is the natural logarithm of the number of days starting from the day 
of the announcement until the day of the first buyback trade.  
To control for the inherent flexibility that share repurchases offer managers on 
timing the repurchase trades (Jagannathan et al., 2000) when the stock is undervalued, we 
follow Bonaimé (2012) and Bargeron et al. (2011) and include the Standard Deviation of 
stock returns. This variable is estimated as the standard deviation of daily returns over the 
200-trading-day period beginning 210 days before the announcement and ending 10 days 
before the announcement.  
Moreover, we use additional control variables that are well established in the 
literature. To control for the impact of selling shares to satisfy existing stock option plans 
or additional stock grants (Ofek and Yermack, 2000; Babenko et al., 2012) on completing 
a share buyback program, we include the number of total options issued. We also control 
for the potential impact of firms repurchasing their shares due to conversion of debt into 
common stock, with the variable Convertible Debt, which is estimated as the value of 
convertible debt outstanding (in GB pounds) of firm i at the year-end before the intention 
to buy back shares is announced. As a control of disclosure environment and firm-specific 
information asymmetry, we use the number of analysts following the firm (Number of 
Analysts) as in Jensen et al. (2004). We control for firm growth and perceived valuation 
with Market-to-Book (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Ikenberry et al., 2000), in addition to Excess 
Returns (measured as the cumulative excess return of firm i relative to the FTSE All Share 
index for the 20 days [±22, ±2] relative to the announcement). We control for the impact of 
debt with Leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt over total assets (Jagannathan 
18 
 
and Stephens, 2003). In addition, we control for the excess cash hypothesis (Dittmar, 2000; 
Brockman and Chung, 2001; Oswald and Young, 2008) with the proxy Cash, which is the 
ratio of net income before taxes plus depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other 
deferred charges to total assets (Dittmar, 2000).8  
We also control for the impact of agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) 
with the use of Ownership Concentration (Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007; 
Andriosopoulos and Hoque, 2013) measured as the ratio of closely held shares9 over the 
total common shares outstanding before the repurchase announcement. We control for 
dividend substitution with open market share buyback programs and their tax efficiency 
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002) with the Dividend Yield (Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007; 
McNally, 1999) before the buyback announcement. Alternatively, we use the variable 
Dividend Payout (Dittmar, 2000; Grullon et al., 2002) measured as the ratio of common 
cash dividends relative to the reported net income. 
3.4. Estimation methods  
To formally test our hypotheses, we form the following equation: 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Alternatively, we use as a proxy for cash the variables Expected Cash and Unexpected Cash as defined in 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and our results remain unaltered.   
9
 The variable Closely Held Shares is taken from Worldscope and represents the following: shares held by 
insiders; shares held by officers, directors, and their immediate families; shares held in trust; shares of the 
company held by any other corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial 
institutions); shares held by pension/benefit plans; and shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of 
the outstanding shares. The variable excludes shares under options exercisable within 60 days, shares held in 
a fiduciary capacity, shares held by insurance companies, and preferred stock or debentures that are 
convertible into common shares. 
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ܤݑݕܾܽܿ݇ܥ݋݉݌݈݁ݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߛܥܧܱܱݒ݁ݎܿ݋݂݊݅݀݁݊ܿ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߜܱݐ݄݁ݎܥܧܱ݄ܿܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ߠܨ݅ݎ݉ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧         (1) 
Where Buyback Completion is the percentage of actually repurchased shares relative 
to the number of share intended at the time of the announcement. Information Disclosure 
is a binary variable that WDNHVWKHYDOXHRIRQHZKHQDQDQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKHILUP¶V
intention to buy back shares contains explicit information about the intended buyback 
program and zero otherwise. CEO Overconfidence is a dummy variable as defined in 
section 2.2.1 following Malmendier et al. (2011). Other CEO Characteristics is a matrix of 
CEO traits as described in section 2.2.2. Firm Characteristics is a matrix of firm-specific 
characteristics as described in section 3.3. 
Similar to other corporate finance decisions, information disclosure could be 
potentially endogenous. Healey and Palepu (2001) note that endogeneity is the most 
important limitation of capital market research on the consequences of disclosure. 
Although disclosure precedes the buyback transactions, it is not purely exogenous as firm 
characteristics that influence information disclosure might influence buyback completion 
rates. At the same time, CEOs might choose the information regime that is beneficial for 
them (Hermalin and Katz, 2000). By the same token, CEO characteristics might influence 
the information disclosure of a given firm. To better address this issue, we conduct an 
omitted variable version of Hausman¶V (1978) test for endogeneity of information 
disclosure. We follow Leone et al. (2007) and create an instrumental variable (IV-
Information Disclosure) by regressing information disclosure on all exogenous variables 
(all the right-hand side variables in equation 1) as follows:  ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛܥܧܱܱݒ݁ݎܿ݋݂݊݅݀݁݊ܿ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߜܱݐ݄݁ݎܥܧܱ݄ܿܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߠܨ݅ݎ݉ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧   (2) 
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Equation 2 is estimated via a Tobit where zero and one are applied as the lower and 
upper limits for censoring, respectively. We then add the predicted values from regression 
2 to form equation 3.  
 ܤݑݕܾܽܿ݇ܥ݋݉݌݈݁ݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߮ܫܸ െ ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊ܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߛܥܧܱܱݒ݁ݎܿ݋݂݊݅݀݁݊ܿ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ߜܱݐ݄݁ݎܥܧܱ݄ܿܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߠܨ݅ݎ݉ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧   (3) 
Where, IV-Information Disclosure is the fitted value from regressing information 
disclosure on the set of all exogenous variables in the system (all right-hand variables in 
equation 1) via a Tobit estimation. We test whether IV-Information Disclosure is 
significant. If it is significant, we reject the null that information disclosure is exogenous. 
If it is endogenous, then we replace IV-Information Disclosure with Information 
Disclosure in equation 1 and estimate the equation.10  
3.5. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports the average completion rates of the announced repurchase programs 
and the ranked percentages out of the total sample firms based on the completion rates. 
Moreover, Table 1 reports the average duration from the time of a buyback announcement 
and the first trade, measured in days. We find that almost half of the firms that intend to 
repurchase their shares have not done so. In addition, we find that 25% of the sample firms 
repurchase less than 40% of the shares targeted in the announcement and that the average 
completion rate for all repurchasing firms is approximately 31%, similar to the completion 
rates reported in Ikenberry et al. (2000). However, when estimating the average 
completion rates for the sub-sample of those firms initiating the buyback program 
                                                 
10
 We cannot use an endogenous Tobit model, as the endogenous variable information disclosure is a binary 
variable.  
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(repurchasing firms), we find that the average completion rate is 69.45%, which is similar 
to the US completion rates of approximately 70% and 80%, reported in Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) and Jagannathan et al. (2000), respectively. Moreover, we find that only 
less than half of the share buyback announcements contain explicit information on the 
intended program. We also find that on average it takes 320 days for the first buyback 
trade. However, when considering only the repurchasing firms we find that it takes on 
average 51 days for the first buyback trade. The difference in the initiation lag between the 
overall sample and repurchasing firms shows that the firms that are most committed to 
buying back their shares initiate the buyback program with a very short delay. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the open market share repurchase announcements 
by calendar year. The majority of the announcements are located in the second half of the 
10-year research period, which is consistent with the recent trend and popularity of share 
repurchases in the United Kingdom. In addition, we find that firms announcing their 
intention to conduct an open market buyback program are large, since their respective 
average (median) market capitalization is 11.6 (1.526) billion GB Pounds. Moreover, we 
find that the average (median) market-to-book ratio is 2.87 (2.03), similar to the market-to-
book ratios for repurchasing firms reported in Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Cook et 
al. (2004). In addition, the figures on share buybacks confirm the argument that open 
market share buybacks have become increasingly popular since the second half of the 
1990s due to the relaxation of previously stringent regulations, consistent with v.Eije and 
Megginson (2008). We include year dummies to control for this time effect in our models. 
In 1998, the completion rate for repurchasing firms is higher than 100% of the intended 
amount, because repurchasing firms reserve the right to repurchase more shares than those 
initially disclosed provided it is within the legal authorization attained by the shareholders.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A in Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the firm-specific variables 
that have the potential to influence the completion rates of the identified buyback programs 
announced by the firms used in our analysis. The total number of firms identified for each 
variable along with the mean, median, and minimum and maximum values are reported. 
Our sample consists of firms with a wide range of sizes, with market capitalizations 
ranging from £2.25 million to £233 billion. Firms announcing their intention to buy back 
shares have on average excess returns of 0.6%, which contradicts our predictions that 
repurchasing firms are more likely to be undervalued. Furthermore, firms are not highly 
leveraged, having an average debt ratio of 16.5% and an average ownership concentration 
ratio of 17.3%.  
In our sample, 40.1% of the firms announced their intention to conduct an open 
market buyback program in the past, while the completion rate among those firms of their 
most recent open market buyback announcement was only 19.1%. Moreover, 68.7% of the 
firms in our sample disclose explicit information about the intended buyback program, 
which can be an indicator of a stronger commitment to implementing the buyback 
program.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The descriptive statistics presented in Panel B in Table 3 show that the average 
(median) CEO age is 54.31 (54) with a minimum of 31 years and a maximum of 77 years. 
In addition, a small percentage (1 in 11) of our sample CEOs are overconfident. The 
average CEO tenure is approximately 9 years, and the figures show that the CEO turnover 
is low in the sample companies. Average tenure in the firm is 17 years with a median of 13 
years, and 29% of the CEOs are internally appointed. These figures suggest that, on 
average, CEOs stay with the same company for a long period and thus become very 
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familiar with theLUILUP¶V corporate culture and respective industry. Surprisingly, only 15% 
of the CEOs have business-related education, and 22% of the CEOs have a PDVWHU¶V degree 
or above. However, we find that 97% of CEOs pursued a business career even though they 
do not have relevant degrees. Finally, 76% of the CEOs are male, and only half of the 
CEOs are British although our sample firms are quoted on the London Stock Exchange. 
4. The drivers of buyback completion rates  
4.1. Univariate analysis 
To identify the firm-specific characteristics that drive the buyback completion rates, 
we split our sample into three groups: firms that repurchase none of their shares (no 
buyback trades), firms that repurchase their shares but have a completion ratio of less than 
the VDPSOH¶Vaverage of 31.5% (partial completion), and firms that repurchase more than 
the average completion ratio (high completion rate). The univariate analysis reported in 
Table 4 shows that firms with high completion rates are on average substantially larger 
compared to the no-repurchasing and partial completion firms. This is in line with our 
expectations that large firms, which are more likely to be mature with fewer opportunities, 
are more likely to complete their buyback programs. In addition, we find that firms with 
overconfident CEOs and greater analyst coverage display significantly higher buyback 
completion rates. Moreover, we find that widely held firms with higher levels of cash 
show higher completion rates, suggesting that minority shareholders can apply more 
SUHVVXUHRQPDQDJHUV¶GHFLVLRQs to follow through with the buyback program to reduce 
potential agency costs. In addition, we show that firms with higher completion rates have 
high dividend payouts, suggesting that buyback programs are used to supplement rather 
than substitute the existing payout policy. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Surprisingly, we find that firms that tend to have high completion rates are highly 
leveraged. Furthermore, the group of firms with a high completion rate demonstrates the 
highest percentages in terms of the buyback repetition and completion reputation variables, 
with 60.6% and 44.3%, respectively. The latter findings support our argument that firms 
that conduct more than one buyback program, have a good reputation for completing their 
former buyback programs, and disclose details of their current buyback program show a 
stronger ³FRPPLWPHQW´WR successfully completing their current buyback programs that, in 
general, will be initiated within a shorter period. Finally, the univariate analysis shows 
firms that tend to repurchase shares are firms that have CEOs who have been involved 
with a wider network of companies. This suggests that CEOs are concerned about their 
reputation for NHHSLQJWKHLU³SURPLVH´WRUHSXUFKDVHVKDUHV and complete the announced 
buyback program.  
4.2. Tobit estimations 
In this section, we test which factors have a significant impact on the completion rate 
of the announced open market buyback programs. We estimate a series of Tobit models 
with Completion Rate as the dependent variable, while using a number of factors discussed 
earlier as explanatory variables, which can potentially influence the EX\EDFNSURJUDPV¶
completion rate. The two-tailed Tobit model accounts for the censored nature of the 
Completion Rate, which is naturally bounded by zero and manually truncated at one. The 
results from the multivariate Tobit regressions are shown in Table 5.11  
As the first step, in column 1 we assume information disclosure is exogenous. The 
results for Buyback Information show that companies disclosing explicit information are 
likely to have higher buyback completion rates (Hypothesis 1). In addition, firms initiating 
                                                 
11
 In order to minimize the influence of outliers all continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1st  and 
99th percentiles. 
25 
 
the intended buyback program shortly after the announcement are more likely to have high 
completion rates. These findings suggest that firms that disclose explicit information on 
the intended buyback program and have shorter buyback initiation lags are more likely to 
have a clear payout strategy and show a greater commitment to implementing and 
completing the announced program. This is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) 
who show that better disclosure reduces agency problems and firms are more likely to 
distribute more cash.  
The results for CEO Overconfidence show that the overconfidence measure is highly 
significant and positive.12 This suggests that overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
complete the announced buyback programs (Hypothesis 2). This is consistent with 
0DOPHQGLHUDQG7DWHZKRDUJXHWKDWRYHUFRQILGHQW&(2VRYHUHVWLPDWHWKHLUILUP¶V
value of equity and consequently are more likely to SHUFHLYHWKHLUILUP¶VVKDUHSULFHWREH
undervalued. Thus, they tend to complete the intended buyback programs due to their 
undervaluation perception. This is also consistent with a growing body of literature 
showing that CEO overconfidence is related to various corporate events such as capital 
structure (Malmendier et al., 2011), capital budgeting (Hirshleifer et al., 2012), and 
acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
Moreover, we find that larger firms are more likely to complete their buyback 
programs. This is consistent with Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) who find that larger 
firms tend to be more frequent repurchasers. In addition, we find evidence that more 
widely held firms are more likely to complete their buyback programs. Regarding the 
impact of past buyback completion reputation, we find that it is statistically significant and 
                                                 
12
 We replicate our estimations with an alternative CEO overconfidence measure defined as a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when a CEO holds options that are in the money by 67% during the  last 
5 years of their expiration, as in Malmendier et al. (2011). The results are qualitatively similar. 
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positive, consistent with our expectations and Bonaimé (2012). This suggests that firms 
that showed their commitment in completing their former buyback programs are more 
likely to uphold this reputation and complete their current buybacks. In addition, we find 
that Excess Returns before the buyback announcement and Leverage are positively related 
to the buyback completion rate.  
As previous research has shown that information disclosure is endogenous (Healey 
and Palepu, 2001), we examine whether our results are robust after controlling for 
potential endogeneity. We do this by conducting a Hausman (1978) version of the 
endogeneity test in column 2 Table 5. We first predict the variable IV-Information 
Disclosure by regressing information disclosure on all the explanatory variables in 
equation 1. We include IV-Information Disclosure along with Information Disclosure in 
column 2 in Table 5. Since the IV-Information Disclosure variable is significant, 
suggesting that information disclosure is endogenous, we use IV-Information Disclosure 
instead of Information Disclosure in all remaining equations. 
After controlling for endogeneity, consistent with our previous findings, the results 
show that CEO Overconfidence is positive and significantly related to buyback completion 
rates  which is consistent with Hypothesis 2 (column 3 Table 5). This implies that 
overconfident CEOs perceive their shares to be undervalued leading to higher buyback 
completion rates. Our results for Buyback Information (Hypothesis 1) and Buyback 
Reputation still hold, i.e., have a significant and positive impact on buyback completion 
rates. Moreover, Initiation Lag is still negative and significant suggesting that the sooner 
firms start their buyback program the more likely they are to complete it. We find that 
Market-to-Book is positively related with the buyback completion rate, suggesting that 
firms that tend to complete the announced buyback programs are firms that have high 
growth, consistent with Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) and Bonaimé (2012).  
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 [Insert Table 5 here] 
In column 4, Table 5, we enter CEO Overconfidence and all other CEO traits but not 
Information Disclosure and the other variables, to assess the individual impact of CEO 
traits on buyback completion rates. This is to address the issue that CEOs might choose the 
information environment (Hermalin and Katz, 2000) and therefore CEO characteristics 
might influence information disclosure. As expected and consistent with our findings, 
CEO Overconfidence is still positive and economically significant. The results on other 
CEO characteristics show that Age and Business Education are positively related to 
buyback completions. This is consistent with our expectations, suggesting that older CEOs 
KDYHDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHILUP¶VIXQGDPHQWDOVDQGWKHLUVKDUHKROGHUV¶
requirements, carrying out their promise to buy back shares and complete the respective 
buyback program (Hypothesis 3).  
Moreover, we find consistent with our expectations that CEOs with longer tenure and 
therefore greater entrenchment are less likely to complete the buyback program. This 
suggests that CEOs with longer tenure become more entrenched and strengthen their 
influence over the board, which enables them to resist discipline-imposing mechanisms 
such as share buyback programs. This is consistent with Hill and Phan (1991) who find 
that tenure provides CEOs with greater ability to avoid monitoring and incentive alignment 
mechanisms, such as, in this case, share buybacks. In contrast, board connectedness as 
measured with the Number of Directorships Held is positively related to the buyback 
completion rate. This shows that CEOs with a high degree of connectedness consider it is 
in their best interest to uphold their reputation for fulfilling their promises for making 
payouts and completing the respective buyback programs. In column 5, Table 5 we include 
the IV-Information Disclosure variable but not the other firm-specific control variables. 
Our results remain qualitatively the same, and thus, our findings are robust.  
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In the last column in Table 5, we include all the variables in the same equation. Our 
results remain unaltered. In sum, we find that CEO Overconfidence and Information 
Disclosure are positively related to the buyback completion rate. We also find that past 
Excess Returns are positive and Ownership Concentration is negatively related to the 
buyback completion rate. Finally, CEO Age and Number of Directorships remain 
significant after controlling for other factors.  
5. Robustness checks 
For checking the robustness of our results, we partition our initial sample into firms 
that disclose explicit information on the intended buyback program and firms that do not. 
The results in Table 6 show that our main results are driven by firms that disclose explicit 
information on their buyback programs. We find that CEO Overconfidence is positive and 
Initiation Lag is negatively related to buyback completion rates. We also find that Market-
to-Book, Excess Returns, and CEO Tenure have a positive impact, whereas Ownership 
Concentration and Dividend Payout have a negative impact on buyback completion rates. 
This confirms our expectations that information disclosure is related to a higher 
commitment to follow through with the announced buyback program.  
We also partition our sample based on repetitions of buyback programs. Our main 
results are driven by firms that conduct more than one share buyback program. IV-Buyback 
Information is significant and positive, and Initiation Lag is negative and significant, 
consistent with our previous results. Market-to-Book, Excess Returns, and Leverage are 
positive and significant. In contrast, Ownership Concentration and Dividend Payout are 
negative and significant.    
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Moreover, we examine the determinants of information disclosure as it is interesting 
on its own virtue and to accommodate the endogeneity of disclosure in our buyback 
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completion analysis. Existing literature argues that firm-specific characteristics could 
influence information disclosure. For example, larger and widely held firms followed by 
numerous analysts might disclose more information (Brockman et al., 2008). At the same 
time, CEOs might choose the information regime (Hermalin and Katz, 2000). We perform 
logit regressions with Buyback Information as the dependent variable, to identify which 
characteristics drive firms to announce explicit information about their intended buyback 
programs. We also include the CEO characteristics since they might influence the 
information environment. The results reported in Table 7 show that CEO Overconfidence 
is positively related to Information Disclosure, which implies that overconfident managers 
provide more information about their intention to buy back shares. We find that larger 
companies provide more disclosure. We also find that Buyback Repetition is negatively 
related to Buyback Information, which implies that companies that repeat buyback 
programs disclose less information. However, Number of Analysts is not significant, 
LPSO\LQJWKDWILUPV¶LQIRUPDWLRQHQYLURQPHQWGRes not affect information disclosure 
regarding buyback programs after controlling all other factors. In addition, we find that 
firms that have British nationals as CEOs and CEOs with business education are more 
likely to provide more information regarding their share buyback programs. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Finally, we examine the impact of firm-specific and CEO characteristics on buyback 
completion rates while actively considering the impact of time. We do this by using a 
hazard model in which the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the 
company has followed through with its buyback program and zero if the company has not 
made any buyback trades. The time variable we use is the initiation lag in days, since it is a 
highly significant determinant of buyback completion.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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The results presented in Table 8 are similar for the two equations and show that 
Ownership Concentration is negatively related to the completion rate (hazard ratio of 
0.986). This suggests that firms with higher agency problems are less likely to complete 
their buyback program. The Buyback Repetition dummy, Completion Reputation, and 
Buyback Information Disclosure are highly significant and positively related to the 
buyback completion rate as they have a hazard ratio higher than 1. In addition, we find that 
longer CEO tenure is positively related to a higher buyback completion rate. In conclusion, 
our findings are robust across varying specifications, and the disclosure on the intended 
buyback program, CEO Overconfidence, Buyback Repetition, and Completion Reputation 
have a significant and positive impact on buyback completion rates. In sum, the results 
from the hazard models are qualitatively similar to the results from the Tobit models. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
The goal of this study is to assess whether the choice of disclosing explicit 
information or not on the intended share buyback program and CEO overconfidence 
among other characteristics explain share buyback completion rates. We show that 
disclosing explicit information about the intended buyback program can serve as a strong 
signal of DILUP¶V intentions to complete the intended buyback program. In addition, we 
show that CEO characteristics have a strong impact on completing a share buyback 
program. In particular, we find robust evidence that overconfident CEOs are significantly 
more likely to complete the intended buybacks. We also find that firms initiating their 
buyback program soon after the announcement and those conducting repeat buyback 
programs are more likely to complete their current buyback program. In addition, we find 
that CEO age, connectedness, and firm tenure are positively related to the buyback 
completion rate.  
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We also consider that information disclosure could be endogenous, as firm-specific 
and CEO-specific characteristics could influence the information environment. We control 
for endogeneity by using a two-stage Tobit regression, and our findings remain robust and 
are not driven by endogeneity. Since we argue that information disclosure is endogenous, 
we examine the determinants of information disclosure. We find that overconfident CEOs 
disclose more information and firms that have a shorter initiation lag are more likely to 
disclose explicit information on their intended buyback program. 
 In addition, we undertake further robustness checks. First, we split our samples into 
firms that disclose explicit information and those that do not, and our findings hold. 
Second, we split our sample into firms that conduct more than one buyback program and 
those that do not during our sample period, and our results remain qualitatively similar. 
Finally, we use a hazard model estimation where the initiation lag serves as the time 
variable, and our findings still hold. In sum, our results survive a battery of robustness 
checks. However, we do not assess whether managerial miscalibration (in Ben-David et 
al., 2012) affects share buyback completion rates, which could be an area for further 
research.  
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Table 1 
Share repurchase completion rates in the United Kingdom. 
 No. % of all firms 
Repurchasing 181 45.25 
Non-Repurchasing Firms 219 54.75 
Total  400 100% 
   
Buyback Information 126 31.50 
No Buyback Information 274 68.50 
Total  400 100% 
 
  
Percentiles 
  
0 219 54.75 
0.1±20% 64 16.00 
21±40% 36 9.00 
41±60% 18 4.50 
61±80% 17 4.25 
>81% 46 11.50 
Total 400 100% 
   
 
Mean Median 
Difference in days of initiation 
         Entire sample 319.35 547 
       Repurchasing firms 51.10 8 
 
  Completion ratio 
       Entire sample 31.43% 0.00% 
       Repurchasing firms 69.45% 33.77% 
Notes: This table reports the number and percentage of firms that have actually repurchased their shares 
(Repurchasing firms) and those that have not repurchased any of their shares (Non-Repurchasing firms) for 
1997 to 2006. Additionally, the table reports the number of firms that disclosed explicit information about 
their intended buybacks (Buyback information) and those firms that did not disclose any information (No 
Buyback information). Furthermore, the table reports the distribution of buyback activity. Finally, the table 
reports the statistics for the completion rates and the number of days from the day of the announcement to 
the day of initiation of the announced share repurchase programs, for the entire sample of announced 
buyback programs and sub-sample of repurchasing firms (Repurchasing firms). 
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Table 2 
Yearly distribution of firm characteristics and their completion rates. 
Year No. 
(%) of 
total 
sample 
Completion rates (%) 
(total sample) No. 
Completion rates (%) 
(repurchasing firms) Market-to-Book 
Market capitalization 
(millions of GBP) 
 
  Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1997 15 4% 53.83 3.70 8 100.93 43.01 1.859 1.534 10,100 3,868 
1998 34 9% 56.20 0.00 14 136.49 32.14 2.645 2.025 12,700 937 
1999 21 5% 12.39 0.00 6 43.37 35.75 2.386 0.945 8,988 461 
2000 22 6% 26.06 0.00 9 63.70 80.06 2.492 1.632 12,000 851 
2001 37 9% 19.52 2.12 19 38.02 27.05 3.048 2.223 7,275 1,180 
2002 51 13% 27.65 4.39 27 52.23 28.76 3.492 3.077 17,100 1,599 
2003 41 10% 18.02 0.00 18 41.04 18.40 2.832 2.122 6,201 1,068 
2004 56 14% 30.70 0.00 24 71.63 48.07 2.825 1.806 10,900 1,644 
2005 65 16% 30.82 0.00 28 71.55 47.94 2.658 1.451 12,400 1,586 
2006 58 15% 41.80 0.00 28 86.59 27.12 3.176 2.225 13,100 2,202 
 
 
 
         
Total 400 100% 31.43% 0.00% 181 69.45% 33.77% 2.874 2.027 11,600 1,526 
Notes: This table reports the annual distribution of share repurchase announcements and the completion rates of the respective announcements of the 
overall sample for 1997 to 2006. In addition, the table reports the average and median values per annum of the completion rates of the intended 
amount targeted at the time of the repurchase announcement and the respective values (at the beginning of the year before the announcement) of size 
proxied by the market capitalization, and valuation proxied by the market-to-book ratio. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics.  
Panel A. Firm-specific variables N Mean Median Min Max 
Completion rate (%) 400 31.5 0 0 13.81 
Information disclosure 400 0.69 1 0 1 
Initiation lag days 400 319.35 547 0 547 
Buyback reputation 400 0.19 0 0 5.26 
Buyback repetition 400 0.4 0 0 1 
Size (millions of GBP) 358 11,600 1,526 2.25 233,000 
Market-to-book 358 2.87 2.03 0.62 7.09 
Excess returns 373 0.01 0 ±0.22 0.23 
Leverage  364 0.17 0.12 0 0.79 
Options (%) 318 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.84 
Convertible debt (%) 318 0.62 0.00 0.00 87.59 
No. of analysts 400 11.31 11.00 0.00 47.00 
Standard deviation 373 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.18 
Cash 333 0.15 0.14 ±1.15 0.65 
Ownership concentration 340 17.31 13.11 0 91.63 
Dividend payout 303 37.39 37.67 0 95.57 
Dividend yield 358 3.12 3.05 0 9.83 
Panel B. CEO traits  
     
CEO overconfidence 400 0.11 0 0 1 
CEO age 302 54.31 54 31 77 
CEO tenure 310 8.88 8 1 40 
Tenure in the firm 306 16.56 13 1 42 
Number of companies worked for 294 2.34 2 0 11 
Number of directorships held 300 6.57 7 0 17 
Founder 395 0.37 0 0 1 
Internally  396 0.29 0 0 1 
Business education 396 0.15 0 0 1 
Highest education 396 0.22 0 0 1 
Business or non-business career 396 0.97 1 0 1 
Gender 397 0.76 1 0 1 
Nationality  397 0.55 1 0 1 
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Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Panel A presents the firm-specific characteristics, and Panel B presents 
the CEO related variables. Completion Rate is the percentage of the repurchased shares relative to the amount targeted at the time of the announcement, where 
the amount targeted is explicitly stated as the total number of shares. Alternatively, the targeted number of shares is extrapolated by the ILUPV¶PDUNHWYDOXH
with the current price at the time of announcement (when the target percentage of shares to be repurchased is stated) or extrapolated from the relative value of 
the shares at the time of the announcement (when an explicit monetary value is disclosed in the announcement). Information Disclosure takes the value of one 
when an announcement of the intention to buy back shares contains explicit information about the intended buyback program and zero when no information is 
disclosed. Initiation lag is the number of days from the day of the announcement to the initiation of the repurchase program. Buyback reputation is the 
completion rate of the most recent buyback program implemented by firm i. Buyback repetition is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has 
announced its intention to buy back its shares in the past, during the ten-year period under study, and zero otherwise. Size is the market capitalization for firm 
i at the year-end before the announcement of the intention to buy back shares and reported in millions of GB pounds. Market to-Book is the ratio of market 
value for each company i to its respective book value of assets at the year-end before the announcement of the intention to buy back shares. Excess returns is 
the cumulative excess return of firm i relative to the FTSE All Share index for the period of 22 to 2 days before the announcement. Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to the book value of total assets of firm i at the year-end before the announcement of the intention to buy back shares. Options is the value (in 
GB pounds) of all options exercised scaled my market capitalization of firm i at the year-end before the announcement of the intention to buy back shares. 
Convertible debt is the value of convertible debt outstanding (in GB pounds) of firm i at the year-end before the announcement of the intention to buy back 
shares. Number of analysts is the number of analyst recommendations of firm i at the year-end before the announcement of the intention to buy back shares. 
Standard deviation is the 200-day standard deviation of daily returns for the time period ±210 to ±10 days for firm i before the buyback announcement. Cash 
is the ratio of net income before taxes plus depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges to total assets for firm i before the buyback 
announcement. Ownership concentration is the percentage of closely held shares divided by the number of total common shares outstanding at the year-end 
before the repurchase announcement. Dividend payout is the ratio of common cash dividends relative to the reported net income for each firm i at the year-
end before the open market share repurchase announcement. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends paid relative to the share price, for each firm i at the year-
end before the repurchase announcement. CEO Overconfidence is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for those CEOs who at any point during the 
sample period, hold an option until the year of expiration even though the option is at least 40% in the money entering its final year. Gender is a dummy equal 
to one if the CEO is male and zero otherwise. Nationality is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has a British citizenship and zero otherwise. CEO Age 
is the difference between the date of birth and the end of 2011 expressed in years. Founder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is the 
ILUP¶VIRXQGHUDQG]HURRWKHUZLVHCEO Tenure is the difference between joining date as CEO and ending in 2011, expressed in years. Tenure in the firm is 
the number of years employed by the company. Internally is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was appointed internally and zero otherwise. Number 
of companies worked for is the number of companies the CEO has worked as a director. Number of directorships held is the number of companies in which 
the CEO is serving as director at the time. Business education is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has received a business education and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 4 
Univariate sorting on completion rate. 
 
No buyback trades Partial completion rate High completion rate Homogeneity 
across means 
Homogeneity  
across medians Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Information disclosure 218 0.619 1 87 0.609 1 94 0.915 1  (0.000) ***  (0.001) *** 
Initiation lag (days) 218 542.07 547 87 75.17 19 94 28.83 6  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Buyback reputation 218 0.055 0 87 0.258 0 94 0.443 0  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Buyback repetition 218 0.257 0 87 0.54 1 94 0.606 1  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Size (millions of GBP) 182 7,763 647 83 9,577 1,561 93 20,700 2,229  (0.012) **  (0.000) *** 
Market-to-book 182 2.501 1.718 83 3.314 2.712 93 3.212 2.315  (0.697)  (0.000) *** 
Excess returns 196 0.001 ±0.007 83 0.004 0.002 94 0.019 0.017  (0.529)  (0.601) 
Leverage  188 0.14 0.093 83 0.18 0.171 93 0.201 0.177  (0.008) ***  (0.193) 
Options % 219 0.005 0 87 0.010 0 94 0.050 0  (0.456)  (0.544) 
Convertible debt % 219 0.500 0 87 0.200 0 94 1.200 0  (0.388)  (0.416) 
No. of analysts 219 8.105 6 87 12.897 13 94 17.287 17  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Standard deviation 193 0.025 0.019 86 0.018 0.016 94 0.015 0.013  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Cash 177 0.143 0.138 76 0.178 0.169 80 0.130 0.110  (0.079) *  (0.003) *** 
Ownership concentration 166 21.83 19.385 82 12.675 10.809 92 13.289 5.231  (0.000) ***  (0.002) *** 
Dividend payout 159 32.349 30.53 73 43.028 41.658 71 42.89 41.842  (0.000) ***  (0.005) *** 
Dividend yield 182 3.078 2.958 83 2.975 3.152 93 3.331 3.175  (0.374)  (0.817) 
CEO overconfidence 219 0.064 0 87 0.069 0 94 0.255 0  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Gender 219 0.658 1 87 0.885 1 94 0.904 1  (0.000) ***  (0.017) ** 
Nationality 219 0.457 0 87 0.632 1 94 0.713 1  (0.000) ***  (0.012) ** 
CEO age 138 3.971 3.990 77 3.988 3.990 87 3.998 3.990  (0.392)  (0.994) 
Founder 216 0.491 0 87 0.218 0 94 0.223 0  (0.000) ***  (0.230) 
CEO tenure 147 2.043 2.080 75 1.939 2.080 88 2.005 1.950  (0.540)  (0.340) 
Tenure in the firm 142 2.656 2.710 77 2.475 2.480 87 2.565 2.560  (0.162)  (0.090) * 
Internally 216 0.264 0 87 0.287 0 94 0.362 0  (0.243)  (0.362) 
Number of companies worked for 216 0.621 0.000 87 0.941 1.100 94 0.926 1.100  (0.000) ***  (0.000) *** 
Number of directorships held 124 1.753 1.950 67 1.797 2.080 80 1.842 1.950  (0.679)  (0.771) 
Business education 216 0.116 0 87 0.161 0 94 0.213 0  (0.108)  (0.259) 
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics for the three sub-groups of firms with Completion Rate = 0, Completion Rate > 0 DQG&RPSOHWLRQ
Rate > 31.5%. Completion Rate is the percentage of the repurchased shares relative to the amount targeted at the time of the announcement. The variables are 
defined as in Table 3 and all continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Homogeneity, reports the p-values based on Ȥ2 and 
3HDUVRQ¶VFRQWLQXLW\FRUUHFWLRQ Ȥ2 for the homogeneity test of means, and medians, respectively, across the three sub-groups of firms with no buyback trades 
(Completion Rate = 0%), partial completion rate (Completion Rate > 0 .5%), and high completion rate (Completion Rate > 31.5%). 
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* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 5 
Tobit regressions on the drivers of buyback completion rates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Cons 0.195 (0.39) -0.468 (-0.80) -0.597 (-0.99) -2.323 (-1.58) -0.889 (-0.63) -3.889*** (-2.55) 
CEO overconfidence 0.528*** (3.05) 0.636*** (4.14) 0.620*** (3.94) 0.601*** (3.45) 0.550*** (2.86) 0.616*** (3.46) 
Information disclosure 0.411*** (4.70) 0.386*** (4.42)         
IV-Information disclosure  
 
0.858* (1.86) 1.369*** (2.81)   1.288*** (4.14) 0.493*** (5.58) 
Initiation lag -0.206*** (-7.68) -0.175*** (-6.58) -0.169*** (-6.27)     -0.157*** (-6.75) 
Buyback reputation 0.269*** (2.59) 0.560*** (5.36) 0.567*** (5.54)     0.469*** (3.69) 
Buyback repetition 0.112 (1.43) 0.300*** (2.52) 0.313** (2.51)     0.046 (0.60) 
Size 0.297*** (5.56) 0.287*** (4.84) 0.211*** (3.12)     0.152*** (3.60) 
Market-to-book 0.039 (1.63) 0.049* (1.93) 0.054 (2.05)     0.023 (1.02) 
Excess returns 1.131*** (3.49) 1.432*** (3.74) 1.536*** (3.90)     1.040*** (3.26) 
Leverage 0.624** (2.25) 0.654** (2.37) 0.645** (2.22)     0.305 (1.06) 
Options -0.105 (-0.77) -0.144 (-0.69) -0.148 (-0.80)     0.152 (0.63) 
Convertible debt -0.355 (-0.17) 0.859 (0.39) 0.715 (0.35)     0.525 (0.20) 
No. of analysts -0.003 (-0.37) -0.004 (-0.58) -0.004 (-0.54)     0.003 (0.35) 
Standard deviation 0.190 (0.10) -0.438 (-0.25) -0.378 (-0.20)     -2.535 (-1.23) 
Cash 0.273 (0.84) 0.539 (1.43) 0.615* (1.66)     -0.085 (-0.23) 
Ownership concentration -0.003 (-0.80) -0.003 (-0.97) -0.003 (-0.93)     -0.015*** (-3.78) 
Dividend payout 0.001 (0.22) 0.000 (-0.18) -0.001 (-0.24)     -0.003 (-1.36) 
Dividend yield 0.020 (0.63) 0.029 (0.89) 0.033 (0.96)     0.038 (1.09) 
Gender       -0.078 (-0.25) 0.502** (2.36) -0.011 (-0.03) 
Nationality  
 
 
 
  0.189 (1.51) 0.360*** (2.74) 0.191 (1.52) 
Ln(age)  
 
 
 
  0.631* (1.74) -0.191 (-0.48) 1.079*** (2.88) 
Founder  
 
 
 
  0.116 (0.75) 0.161 (0.99) -0.005 (-0.04) 
Tenure as CEO  
 
 
 
  0.360*** (2.85) 0.302** (2.20) 0.206* (1.91) 
Tenure in the firm       -0.530*** (-4.06) -0.353*** (-2.78) -0.439*** (-3.54) 
Internally  
 
 
 
  0.178 (1.20) 0.277* (1.69) 0.141 (1.01) 
Number of companies 
worked for       -0.183 (-1.58) -0.022 (-0.20) -0.176 (-1.60) 
Number of directorships 
held  
 
 
 
  0.172** (2.17) 0.131 (1.53) 0.144* (1.87) 
Business education  
 
 
 
  0.279* (1.83) 0.222 (1.59) 0.172 (1.12) 
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Industry/year dummy  9  
 
9  
 
9   9   9   9   
  
 
          
Pseudo R2(%) 42.76 
 
43.18  39.46  8.42  13.59  56.88  
Obs. 251  251  251  225  225  201  
Notes: This table presents the results on the two-stage Tobit regressions for estimating the determinants of the completion rates for a sample of 400 
announcements of intention to buy back shares in the open market from 1997 to 2006 in the UK. The dependent variable is the Completion Rate, which is the 
percentage of the repurchased shares relative to the amount targeted at the time of the announcement. The independent variables are defined as in Table 3 and 
all continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The two-tailed Tobit models are truncated at 0% and 100%. The t-statistics are 
based on cluster adjusted robust standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 2009) and are reported in parentheses.  
*
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6 
Tobit regressions on the robustness of the drivers of buyback completion rates. 
 Buyback Information = 1 Buyback Information = 0 Buyback Repetition = 1 Buyback Repetition = 0 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Cons 2.671* (1.83) 2.433* (1.85) 3.051 (1.46) 3.051 (1.46) 
CEO overconfidence 0.173*** (2.52) ±0.099 (±0.28) 0.057 (0.20) 0.057 (0.20) 
IV-Information disclosure     1.014*** (7.11) 0.501*** (3.77) 
Initiation lag ±0.089*** (±3.77) ±0.023 (±1.16) ±0.158*** (±5.57) ±0.158*** (±5.57) 
Buyback repetition 0.397*** (3.06) 0.078 (0.63)     
Buyback reputation ±0.032 (±0.33) 0.044 (0.58)     
Size 0.249*** (3.93) 0.272*** (3.32) 0.344*** (4.55) 0.157* (1.92) 
Market-to-book 0.065** (2.28) ±0.029 (±1.61) 0.0115 (0.42) 0.033 (0.91) 
Excess returns 0.874** (2.08) 1.037*** (2.61) 1.794*** (3.82) 1.794*** (3.82) 
Leverage 0.340 (1.34) 0.440 (1.36) 1.045*** (2.96) 1.045*** (2.96) 
Options ±2.619 (±0.06) ±0.407 (±0.85) ±0.109** (±2.31) ±0.109** (±2.31) 
Convertible debt ±7.287* (±1.90) ±0.982 (±0.30) ±0.101 (±1.63) ±0.101 (±1.63) 
No. of analysts 0.011 (1.32) ±0.014 (±1.40) 0.011 (0.93) 0.011 (0.93) 
Standard deviation ±1.981 (±1.00) 5.448* (1.65) ±1.090 (±0.33) ±1.090 (±0.33) 
Cash ±0.198 (±0.35) ±0.501 (±1.26) 0.044 (0.06) 0.044 (0.06) 
Ownership concentration ±0.010*** (±3.52) ±0.002 (±0.69) ±0.023*** (±4.19) ±0.023*** (±4.19) 
Dividend payout ±0.004* (±1.75) 0.001 (0.25) ±0.007** (±2.40) ±0.007** (±2.40) 
Dividend yield 0.054 (1.60) 0.029 (0.85) 0.027 (0.51) 0.027 (0.51) 
Gender 0.456 (1.15)   0.412* (1.74) 0.412* (1.74) 
Nationality 0.250** (2.19) 0.104 (1.14) 0.398*** (3.50) 0.398*** (3.50) 
Ln(age) ±0.542 (±1.56) ±0.743** (±2.39) ±0.665 (±1.44) ±0.665 (±1.44) 
Founder 0.104 (0.88) 0.314 (2.05) 0.060 (0.37) 0.060 (0.37) 
Tenure as CEO 0.346*** (3.64) 0.058 (0.58) 0.343** (2.29) 0.343** (2.29) 
Tenure in the firm ±0.227** (±2.27) ±0.044 (±0.37) ±0.260** (±2.21) ±0.260** (±2.21) 
Internally 0.191 (1.53) ±0.120 (±0.91) 0.112 (0.43) 0.112 (0.43) 
Number of companies  
worked for ±0.052 (±0.56) ±0.038 (±0.55) ±0.094 (±0.82) ±0.094 (±0.82) 
Number of directorships held 0.001 (0.02) ±0.071 (±0.93) 0.072 (0.76) 0.072 (0.76) 
Business education 0.182 (1.53) 0.107 (0.72) ±0.013 (±0.09) ±0.013 (±0.09) 
Industry /year dummy 9   9   9   9   
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Pseudo R2 (%) 61.48  60.75  69.75  69.75  
Obs 188  179  170  164  
Notes: This table presents the results on the two-stage Tobit regressions for assessing the drivers of the buyback completion rates. The dependent variable 
is the Completion Rate, which is the percentage of the repurchased shares relative to the amount targeted at the time of the announcement. The sample is 
FRPSULVHGRIDQQRXQFHPHQWVRI WKH ILUP¶V LQWHQWLRQ WREX\EDFNVKDUHV LQ WKHRSHQPDUNHW IURP WRLQ WKH8.7KH table presents the 
results for two sample partitions. First, the partitioned sample based on those firms that disclose explicit information about their intended buyback 
programs (buyback information = 1) and those which do not disclose any information (buyback information = 0). Second, the partitioned sample based on 
firms that have made a buyback announcement in the past (buyback repetition = 1) and those that did not make such an announcement before the current 
buyback program (buyback repetition = 0). The independent variables are defined as in Table 3 and all continuous control variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics are based on cluster adjusted robust standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 2009) and are reported in 
parentheses.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 7 
Logit regressions on disclosing explicit buyback information. 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Cons ±7.200 (±0.91) ±11.465* (±1.90) 
CEO overconfidence 4.419** (2.36) 2.397*** (2.90) 
Buyback reputation ±0.193 (±0.57) 
 
 Buyback repetition ±1.658*** (±2.90) ±1.379*** (±3.07) 
Size 0.360*** (2.99) 0.316*** (4.96) 
Market-to-book 0.079 (0.69) 
 
 Excess returns ±5.824*** (±2.70) ±4.274*** (±2.59) 
Leverage ±1.452 (±0.94) 
 
 Options 0.128 (0.30) 
 
 Convertible debt ±0.031 (±1.09) 
 
 No. of analysts 0.002 (0.04) 0.018 (0.61) 
Standard deviation 0.132 (1.00) 5.295 (0.52) 
Cash ±1.170 (±0.50) ±0.087 (±0.04) 
Ownership concentration 0.000 (±0.02) 0.012 (1.03) 
Dividend payout ±0.004 (±0.24) 
 
 Dividend yield 0.163 (0.80) 
 
 Gender 
 
 
1.533 (0.99) 
Nationality 1.137* (1.89) 1.213*** (2.55) 
Ln(age) 2.523 (1.35) 2.589 (1.77) 
Founder 0.517 (0.75) ±0.102 (±0.19) 
Tenure as CEO ±0.361 (±0.57) 0.006 (0.01) 
Tenure in the firm ±0.069 (±0.10) ±0.065 (±0.12) 
Internally ±0.377 (±0.50) ±0.288 (±0.49) 
Number of companies worked for 0.079 (0.15) 0.412 (0.94) 
Number of directorships held ±0.096 (±0.22) 0.205 (0.57) 
Business education 1.822 (2.29) 1.220** (2.09) 
Industry/year dummy  9  
 
9  
 
     Pseudo R2 (%) 29.38 
 
25.20 
 Log likelihood ±62.630 
 
±85.705 
 Obs 237 
 
260 
 Notes: This table presents the results on the logit regressions for assessing the drivers of 
disclosing explicit information about the intended buyback program. The sample is comprised 
RIDQQRXQFHPHQWVRIWKHILUP¶VLQWHQWLRQWREX\EDFNVKDUHVLQWKHRSHQPDrket from 1997 
to 2006 in the UK. The dependent variable is the dummy variable Information disclosure, 
which takes the value of one if the announcement contains explicit information about the 
intended buyback program and zero otherwise. The variables are defined as in Table 3 and all 
continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics are 
based on cluster adjusted robust standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 2009) and are 
reported in parentheses.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 
Hazard models on the drivers of buyback completion rates. 
 
Hazard ratio Z-stat 
Hazard 
ratio Z-stat 
Information disclosure 1.842** (2.50) 2.260** (2.70) 
CEO overconfidence 2.028*** (3.30) 2.055*** (3.34) 
Buyback reputation 2.105*** (3.53) 2.132** (2.82) 
Buyback repetition 1.864*** (3.04) 2.035*** (4.06) 
Size 1.449*** (4.22) 1.328*** (3.09) 
Market-to-book 1.072* (1.82) 1.023 (0.34) 
Excess returns 3.208 (1.52) 1.924*** (2.62) 
Leverage 1.629 (0.80) 0.364 (±1.29) 
Options 0.000 (±0.41) 0.590 (0.55) 
Convertible debt 0.000 (±1.08) 0.001 (±0.72) 
No. of analysts 1.024 (1.15) 1.040 (1.59) 
Standard deviation 0.000** (±2.82) 0.000** (±2.53) 
Cash 1.738 (0.53) 3.779 (0.97) 
Ownership concentration 0.986** (±2.23) 0.968** (±3.35) 
Dividend payout 1.005 (0.90) 1.006 (0.86) 
Dividend yield 0.854** (±2.06) 0.802* (±1.92) 
Gender 
  
0.225 (±1.29) 
Nationality 
  
1.595 (1.52) 
Ln(age) 
  
0.889 (±0.12) 
Founder 
  
1.008 (0.02) 
Tenure as CEO 
  
1.818 (1.92) 
Tenure in the firm 
  
0.303*** (±3.46) 
Internally 
  
0.625 (±1.19) 
Number of companies worked for 
  
0.438** (±2.68) 
Number of directorships held 
  
0.891 (±0.53) 
Business education 
  
0.899 (±0.26) 
 
    Log likelihood ±566.74 
 
±371.04 
 Obs 257 
 
243 
 Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of if a firm has 
conducted a buyback program and zero otherwise. All the variables are defined as in Table 3 
and all continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The time 
variable used in the estimation is initiation lag in days. The z-statistics are based on cluster 
adjusted robust standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 2009) and are reported in parentheses.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
